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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of regional policy is the attainment of a more efficient and/or equitable interregional 
distribution of economic activity (Temple, 1994). Haddad (1999) has demonstrated that in the 
last twenty years or so Brazil has undergone deep structural changes that have been 
responsible for the setback in the process of polarization reversal in the economy. After 1988, 
with the new Constitution, the central government was hampered in advancing its regional 
policy agenda by a profound loss in its revenues to the state and municipal governments. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis reached all levels of government, decreasing their financial 
capability for carrying out new investment ventures. One of the major consequences has been 
the paucity of investment in economic infrastructure that has contributed to increasing the 
average cost of production. Therefore, producers’ costs increased since they faced inefficient 
mechanisms for trade and transportation, many of which lagged technologically. 
 
The regional de-concentration trend that has been verified for the period from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s was heavily influenced by an active government intervention, manifested in 
actions such as direct investments in regional development projects and tax incentives in the 
less developed regions of the country. However, with the fiscal crisis generalized to all levels 
of government, there were fewer options for new public ventures. Even though the country 
witnessed a process of regional de-concentration and an improvement in regional inequality at 
that time, the situation is still striking in Brazil. In terms of the distribution of economic 
activity, Brazilian GDP is heavily concentrated in the Center-South of the country (Figure 1). 
Regarding regional inequality related to per capita GDP, the picture is not different, with 
many states in the poorest region of the country (Northeast) achieving per capita GDP levels 
more than half-way below the national average (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Regional Shares in National GDP, Brazil, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Per Capita Gross Regional Product, Brazil, 2006 
 
The agreed agenda for Brazil includes the competitive integration of the country in the global 
trade network, with additional domestic concerns focused on of sustainable stabilization and 
social cohesion. This implies the attraction of foreign investments and a responsible 
(balanced) budget policy for all levels of government, reinforced by the promulgation of the 
“Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal” (Fiscal Responsibility Law) in 2000. The latter precludes 
regional policies that are based primarily on redistributional expenditures, as was the case in 
the 1970s.  For foreign investors, the search is dominated by attention to maximal financial 
returns with little concern for regional equity; location is defined on a purely economic basis. 
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The results presented in Haddad (1999) suggest that the interplay of market forces in the 
Brazilian economy favors the more developed region of the country. In other words, the 
trickling-down effects generated by market forces are still very unlikely to overtake the 
polarization effects from the Center-South. If regional equity is part of the country’s 
development agenda, an active regional policy by the central government is still needed, in 
order to reduce regional economic disparities, and specifically to address the problems of the 
North and Northeast, traditionally backward areas reliant on low technology activities. The 
improvement of the economic infrastructure in those regions, as well as the establishment of 
enduring competitive advantages, through a consistent human capital policy, are necessary to 
attenuate the adverse regional effects of the development strategy to be pursued by the public 
authorities. 
 
Nowadays, the regional policy carried out by the central government consists of isolated 
subsidies and industrial incentives to growth centers, in addition to constitutional transfers to 
less developed regions and rural areas. In the context of the fiscal adjustment process of the 
1990s, the role of the central government in stimulating directly productive activities and 
enhancing the social overhead capital in the lagging regions is being neglected. In the 
conception of the Real Plan, in 1994, there was no explicit concern about the formulation of a 
regional development policy for the country. The Real Plan was conceived as a global 
stabilization plan, that would include economic reforms (privatization, concessions and 
deregulation) and institutional reforms (tax system, social security and administrative), 
without proposing any strategy for medium and long-run development. However, with the 
benefits from the stabilization and the reforms, a new cycle of private investments emerged. 
These investments tended to concentrate in the South and Southeast regions, which provided a 
full range of non-traditional (e.g. technical skills and urban agglomeration) and traditional 
(e.g. friction of distance – Mercosul) locational factors to attract the incoming capital. The 
lack of investments by the central government, allied to the spurt in private investments, has 
led regional governments to engage in strong competition for private capital through fiscal 
mechanisms (see Baer and Hewings, 2007). 
 
In this context, we can argue that nothing much has been done since the 1988 Constitution. In 
terms of what might be termed a “clearly-defined” regional policy, the central government has 
relied only on constitutional intergovernmental transfers through regional funds. As can be 
seen from Figure 3, such mechanism provides an explicit strategy of geographic targeting to 
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reduce spatial disparities in Brazil. Whether they achieve the goal of classical regional 
policies – namely, the reduction of regional disparities – through direct income transfers to 
poorer states remains to be tested. 
 
Figure 3. Ratio of the Shares in Interregional Government Transfers to Shares in 
National GDP, Brazil, 2006 
 
Note: FPE and FPM transfers (see section 2). 
 
 
While it is commonly accepted that Brazil’s interregional government transfers system 
provides initial distributional effects, there have been attempts to formally assess the 
implications this has had for the domestic pattern of industrial location and, by extension, the 
broader impacts on regional development, considering not only its direct effects, but also the 
indirect and induced effects closely associated with the role played by the existing economic 
structure. Over the next few pages, this paper aims to address this somewhat overlooked issue 
by adopting the following approach. After a brief review of the main institutional aspects of 
interregional government transfers in Brazil, an attempt is made to characterize its recent 
structure. Having established the nature of these transfers, the paper then goes on to evaluate 
their implications for the pattern of regional development within Brazil. In order to achieve 
this objective, an interregional input-output model is prepared and then tested to assess the 
recent impact of interregional government transfers on such variables as regional output and 
income levels. Finally, the tractability of these results is discussed before the possible policy 
implications are drawn. 
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2. Interregional Government Transfers in Brazil 
 
2.1. Some analytics and empirics of government transfers 
 
Considerable shares of public revenue and public expenditure consist of transfers, which are 
payments with no direct counterpart. On the revenue side, that applies to taxes and social 
contributions. Even though the government uses these revenues to finance, for instance, 
public facilities and social benefits, those come to be indirect counterparts. On the expenditure 
side, meanwhile, it applies to social benefits – such as pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
public health care expenditure – and other transfers of income and capital as subsidies granted 
to enterprises or households.
1
 
 
Three kinds of economic reasons are usually invoked to justify the role of transfers. First, 
central governments have advantages over subnational governments in raising revenues from 
many types of particularly productive sources, while subnational governments have 
advantages in providing many types of public services. Quite often, there is an imbalance 
between expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments and their revenue raising 
powers, which ends up resulting in an inability of local governments to provide adequate 
levels of public service. Another rationale for intergovernmental transfers is provided by the 
need of equalization, as there is often a great deal of disparities in revenue-raising capacity 
across decentralized levels of government. Third, when local governments are left to make 
their own decisions, they may end up underspending on certain services where there are 
substantial external benefits to third parties, such as surrounding local governments. 
Moreover, resources from the central level can be used to ensure that basic national priorities 
will be met in all subnational jurisdictions. In case of existence of externalities on other 
jurisdictions, the central government financially supports sub-national authorities in order to 
guarantee the provision of some public services on the local level. As summed up in Nam & 
Parsche (2001), intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical 
imbalance caused by the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different tiers of 
governments but also the horizontal imbalance which is led by the different fiscal capacities 
among jurisdictions at the same level. The compensation for the presence of spillovers or 
                                                          
1
 Uma elaborada tipologia das transferências governamentais é proposta em Bergvall et. al. (2006), artigo no 
qual também são descritas as principais características da governança dessas transferências vigente em países da 
OCDE. 
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externalities between jurisdictions in the provision of regional and local public services is 
likewise a usually accepted rationale for introducing fiscal transfers from central government. 
We may define vertical fiscal imbalance, following Bird & Tarasov (2002), as the resulting 
difference between expenditure and own-source revenues at different levels of government. 
Following the same source, the notion of horizontal fiscal imbalance may be defined as the 
difference in the resources available to governments at the same (subnational) level, where 
this difference stems from the heterogeneity in wealth of subnational jurisdictions. 
 
Meanwhile, transfers from or to the central government can be broken down by region. 
Transfers between the government and households are based on the place of residence, while 
transfers between the government and businesses are based on the place where the business is 
conducted or value is created. As it turns out, it is possible to conduct a regional comparison 
of the relative scale of the public transfers thus broken down. A region is seen as a contributor 
of interregional transfers in terms of public revenues if the per capita transfers by that region’s 
residents to the federal government or social security are higher than the per capita national 
average. Conversely, a region is regarded as a recipient of such transfers if its contribution is 
proportionately lower than would be expected on the basis of its percentage of the population. 
Therefore, evaluation of the interregional transfers on the basis of both public revenue and 
public expenditure reveals the net position of each region in terms of interregional transfers. 
 
The empirical literature on the determinants and impacts of the government transfers on 
regional performance is huge, and a small sample includes the following. Groenewold, 
Hagger & Madden (2003) analyze the regional effects of intergovernmental transfers by a 
federal government, having done so in a two-region model in which regional governments 
determine their tax and expenditure policies so as to maximize the utility of the representative 
household in their region subject to a budget constraint consisting of a CGE model describing 
the regional economy. The model is then calibrated using Australian data, with the authors 
conducting a series of six simulations of an increase in the federal government’s transfer to 
one region matched by a decrease in the transfer payment to the other. In each simulation one 
of the six Australian states was taken as region 1 and the remainder of the country as region 2. 
The authors find that substantial changes in the amount transferred by the federal government 
from one region to the other had little effect on welfare, per capita consumption and wages. 
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Garcia-Milà & McGuire (2004) evaluate the effectiveness of the transfers received by the 
regional governments of Spain from both the central government and the European Union. 
They do so by comparing the economic performance of the regions before and after the 
implementation of the transfers programs, and find that these policies have not been effective 
at stimulating private investment or improving the overall economies of the poorer regions. 
Dias & Silva (2004), meanwhile, evaluate the effectiveness of the transfers received by the 
regional governments of Portugal from the central government, and do not find strong and 
robust evidence that these transfers have been stimulating convergence among Portuguese 
regions and improving the overall economies of the poorer regions. 
 
As the simulation exercise to be conducted in the next section is based on the Brazilian 
experience, it should be pointed out that the redistributive role the government played through 
the federal fiscal system was a common practice in the 1970’s and 1980’s. As reported in 
Haddad (1999), the regional shares of the central government revenues in the poorer regions 
were recurrently smaller than the shares of central government expenditures in those regions 
over the period. In particular, the specific figures suggest the existence of an effective 
redistribution of public funds to the North and Northeast over the period. 
 
The pioneering efforts by Rolim et al. (1996) provide a more complete interpretative scheme 
on interregional flows in Brazil, based on available statistics on trade balance, government 
accounts, public investment, and savings. Indeed, their preliminary results for 1985 reinforce 
the character of interregional government transfers just suggested. Even though the analysis 
covers only one year, it can give a rough idea on how interregional flows were oriented in the 
years preceding 1985. As shown in Haddad (1999), the repeated pattern of government fiscal 
transfers observed in the previous decade, together with the estimates of interregional and 
international trade balances for the Northeast and North in the same period, support the 
following generalization of the results. The North and Northeast presented trade deficits 
recurrently over the period. In the case of the Northeast, the perennial interregional trade 
deficits were partially compensated by international trade surpluses, indicating a transfer of 
foreign exchange earnings to other regions of the country. The continual overall interregional 
trade deficits of these two regions had to be financed by public and/or private savings, so that 
the conditions for macroeconomic balance were met. The conjecture, taking 1985 as a typical 
year, is that the transfers of federal resources to the Northeast, for instance, had to be greater 
than the trade gaps in order to compensate the interregional flows of private capital oriented 
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towards other regions. Even though the figures show a net outflow of private capital from the 
Center-South, less aggregated figures, for 1985, show a tendency of net private capital gains 
to the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as well as the Center-West. The orientation of 
public capital to the less developed regions has often been offset by the flight of private 
capitals. Rolim et al. (1996) argue that this represents the synthesis of bad allocation of 
government funds from the point of view of an efficient regional policy. However, it might be 
argued, based on the previous discussion, that government transfers to the North and 
Northeast, during the 1970’s and early 1980’s were necessary to build the social overhead 
capital in those regions in order to strengthen the potential spread effects from the Center-
South and create self-reinforcing mechanisms in the regions to generate their own sustainable 
growth. 
 
In other words, government transfers might have achieved a greater relevance in the less 
developed regions by creating the necessary infrastructure to foster development and attract, 
in a second moment, private investments to directly productive activities. This hypothesis 
would be better tested by looking at estimates of investments in the region; if it is somehow 
relevant, the relation between the share of public investments in the target region to the share 
of public investments in the country should show an increasing trend during the 1970’s with 
an inflection point after the necessary time for the economic infrastructure to have matured. 
From the estimates for the Northeast, however, an increasing path in the share of public 
investment in the region, compared to the national average, is apparent from 1973 to 1989. 
Even though there seems to be a declining tendency towards the national average in the first 
years of the1990’s, empirical evidence to support the conjecture on the existence of a change 
in gears is very weak. 
 
Meanwhile, redistributive policies carried out by the central government in Brazil through 
interregional government transfers is still a relevant feature of the Brazilian federal fiscal 
system. Regional shares of the central government revenues in the poorer regions have been 
recurrently smaller than the shares of central government expenditures in those regions, a 
feature on which we elaborate down the road. Indeed, appeal to core-periphery arguments 
could be made, as São Paulo, the wealthiest state in the country, concentrated, in 2006, over 
40% of total Federal tax revenue, receiving less than 10% of Federal expenditures. These 
figures suggest the existence of an effective redistribution of public funds from the spatial 
economic core of the economy to the peripheral areas. 
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Monteiro Neto (2006) evaluates the federal government transfers to Brazilian regions and 
states over the 1970-2000 period, and analyze the actual direction taken by the flows of those 
government transfers in comparison with the income flows occurring among states through 
their interregional and international trade. Drawing on Celso Furtado’s hypothesis that 
underdeveloped regions have to spend a huge amount of income to buy sophisticated wage 
goods and capital goods produced in the developed regions to maintain a certain level of 
economic growth, the author shows that in 2000, the resources directed by the federal 
government to the poor regions (North, Northeast and Center-West) were able to offset their 
current trade deficits. 
 
2.2. An overview of the constitutional transfer system in Brazil 
 
One of the main characteristics of the Brazilian economy is the excessive concentration of the 
income in the states of South and Southeast (Figure 1). This feature, as stressed earlier, 
lessens the power of the states and municipalities located mainly in the North and Northeast 
regions in providing public services to the population. The constitutional transfer system in 
Brazil was built in order to overcome or at least to reduce this disparities of economic power 
between the states and municipalities.  
 
With this objective, the mechanisms of transfer from the Union to the States and 
Municipalities can be divided in three kinds: constitutional transfers, legal transfers and 
voluntary transfers. The main constitutional transfers from the Union to States and 
Municipalities are the State Participation Fund (FPE); the Municipalities Participation Fund 
(FPM), the Constitutional Fund of the Center-West; Constitution Fund of the North; 
Constitution Fund of Northeast and the Constitution Fund of Compensation of Industrialized 
Products. The legal transfers are regulated by specific laws like the automatic transfers to 
education and transfers to the health care system. The volunteer transfers are connected to 
specific projects made by states and municipalities and submitted to federal institutions. 
 
Our focus in this article is concentrated in the federal constitutional transfers specifically in 
the State Participation Fund (FPE) and Municipalities Participation Fund (FPM), established 
by the article 159 of the Federal Constitution. The FPE is constituted by 21.5 % of  the 
Income Tax (IR) and 21.5% of the Excise Tax on Industrialized Products (IPI). On the other 
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hand, the FPM is constituted by 22.5% of the Income Tax (IR) and 22.5% of the Excise Tax 
on Industrialized Products (IPI).  
 
The FPE is distributed according to the following rule: 85% of the resources go to the States 
of the North, Northeast and Center-West and 15% are transferred to the States of the South 
and Southeast. The regional distribution is:  25.37 % to the North Region; 52.46% to the 
Northeast; 7.17% to the Center-West; 6.52% to the South and 8.48% to the Southeast.  
 
The FPM is distributed according to the population of the municipality and inversely 
distributed according the average income of the municipality. We have also a division 
between the State capitals and other municipalities (hinterland). Of the total of resources, 
10.0% are distributed to the State capitals; 86.4% for the rest of municipalities and 3.6% to 
municipalities with population above 142.633 inhabitants excluded the capitals.  
 
2.3. Some descriptive figures on the Brazilian transfers system 
 
In this study, we basically have two sets of information. The first concerns the tax revenues 
collected by the Central government along the Brazilian states and the second, in turn, 
provides information regarding the amount of resources transferred to the Brazilian States via 
the Federal constitutional funds, both during the year of 2006. In this section of the paper, we 
will present a broad description of these two datasets. 
 
Table 1 presents the regional distribution of the joint FPE and FPM expenditures in 2006 
compared to the regional distribution of the originating resources that composed the funds in 
the same year. A very important point to be clarified is that the regional origin of these 
resources is very heterogeneous: column A of Table 1 shows that over 40% of Federal tax 
revenues come from just one state, namely, São Paulo, the richest one. Once considered that 
other 20% come from Rio de Janeiro state, it is possible to verify that about 2/3 of the total 
tax revenue is collected in only two states. Distrito Federal, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul 
and Paraná are other important unities, given that their total contribution is approximately 
25%. The remaining share are divided among 21 states, most of the located in North (6 states 
with a total share of 1.70%), Northeast (9 states with a share of 5.34%) regions. 
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Table 1. Regional Shares in Federal Government Tax Revenue* and Expenditures**, 
Brazil – 2006 
 
Regional Revenues (A) Regional Expenditures (B) (A) - (B)
North 1.70 16.88 -15.18
RO 0.13 1.84 -1.71
AC 0.04 1.96 -1.91
AM 0.86 2.15 -1.29
RR 0.04 1.38 -1.34
PA 0.48 4.81 -4.33
AP 0.05 1.88 -1.82
TO 0.09 2.86 -2.77
Northeast 5.34 43.88 -38.54
MA 0.25 5.63 -5.38
PI 0.14 3.44 -3.30
CE 0.82 6.25 -5.43
RN 0.24 3.34 -3.10
PB 0.26 4.03 -3.77
PE 1.27 5.88 -4.62
AL 0.20 3.27 -3.07
SE 0.20 2.80 -2.61
BA 1.98 9.24 -7.26
Southeast 70.90 19.85 51.05
MG 6.24 8.94 -2.70
ES 1.43 1.61 -0.18
RJ 19.64 2.16 17.48
SP 43.59 7.15 36.45
South 10.64 12.18 -1.54
PR 4.12 4.92 -0.81
SC 2.14 2.62 -0.48
RS 4.38 4.63 -0.25
Center-west 11.42 7.21 4.21
MS 0.27 1.45 -1.18
MT 0.32 2.08 -1.75
GO 0.83 3.26 -2.43
DF 10.00 0.43 9.57  
Source: Secretaria da Receita Federal 
* Manufacturing tax (44.0%) and income tax (44.0%) 
** Constitutional transfers (FPE and FPM) 
 
The previous discussion presented an overview of how each Brazilian state contributes to the 
Federal taxation system. Altogether, such constitutional transfers represent around 3.1% of 
Brazilian GDP. In order to analyze our second set of information, Table 1, column B provides 
information regarding the regional distribution of constitutional resources transferred by the 
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Federal government to each Brazilian state. Noteworthy is that São Paulo state receives only 
7.15% of the total amount of transfers against a contribution of 43.59% to the revenues – a 
similar effect is observed to other rich states like Rio de Janeiro and Distrito Federal, i.e., their 
(proportional) contributions to the Federal revenues are higher than the (proportional) amount 
received via the constitutional funds. On the other hand, we observe exactly the opposite for 
poorer states like Maranhão, for instance, which generated only 0.25% of the Federal tax 
revenues but received 5.63% of the total constitutional transfers. This example helps one to 
understand how the allocation of resources by the Central government works in Brazil, in the 
sense that the poorest regions are relatively more benefited than the richest ones. The last 
column of Table 1 summarizes such allocation presenting those regions that directly benefit 
from such constitutional transfers (negative values) and those that are net transferors (positive 
values). 
 
In the next section, we use an interregional input-output model for the Brazilian economy for 
purposes of regional impact assessment. The model is to be used to capture the role of 
interindustrial and interregional relations in the economic development process through the 
evaluation of the regional impact of the existing interregional government transfers 
mechanisms in Brazil. The use of this modeling approach is very relevant to the Brazilian 
case. Its ability to handle detail at a disaggregated level is useful for analyzing the role played 
by Brazil’s spatial productive structure from a systemic perspective. 
 
3. Assessing the Regional Impacts of Interregional Government Transfers in Brazil 
 
We start by describing the model used to analyze the regional effects of interregional 
government transfers in Brazil. The general equilibrium nature of economic interdependence 
and the fact that the policy impacts in various regional markets differ are considered in the 
results of the model. Attention is directed to one main issue, namely the differential regional 
impacts of the current interregional transfers structure on regional value added, a proxy for the 
tax base effects. As the simulations try to mimic a “typical year”, we have selected as our case 
study the transfers’ estimates for 2006. In this paper, we intend to use the fiscal parameters to 
simulate different arbitrary allocations of the interregional government transfers. 
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3.1. Theoretical background 
 
The intersectoral flows in a given economy can be represented by the following system: 
 
X AX Y                             (1) 
 
where X is a (nx1) vector with the value of the total production in each sector, Y is a (nx1) 
vector with values for the final demand, and A is a (nxn) matrix with the technical coefficients 
of production. In this model, the final demand vector can be treated as exogenous to the 
system, such that the level of total production can be determined by the final demand, i.e., 
 
X BY                       (2) 
 
B I A( ) 1                      (3) 
 
where B  is a (nxn) matrix of the Leontief inverse. 
 
According to Miller & Blair (1985), an interregional model for two regions L and M can have 
its coefficients matrix represented in matricial terms as:  
 
MMML
LMLL
AA
AA
A                (4) 
 
Vectors  X
L
 and  X
M
  will constitute the total production vector, X  
 
M
L
X
X
X                (5) 
 
The final demand vector, Y, will be composed of vectors Y
L 
and Y
M 
 
 
M
L
Y
Y
Y                (6) 
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As such, the system presented by equation (2) can then be used to represent an interregional 
system; in this way, it is possible to evaluate the impact of the final demand on total 
production, and from there, on value added, employment, etc., for each one of the regions 
considered in the model. 
 
Multipliers 
 
From the multiplier results it is possible to measure the direct and indirect effects of a change 
in the final demand on production, value added, employment, etc. (see Miller and Blair, 
1985). 
 
From the Leontief inverse matrix (B) defined above, one sees that the production multiplier of 
type I for each economic sector is given by: 
 
P b
j n
j ij
i
n
1
1,...,                (7) 
 
where Pj is the production multiplier for sector j, and bij is an element of matrix B. 
 
Using the structure of derivation elaborated below for the value added multipliers, all the 
other multipliers in the economy can be derived. 
 
The first step is to estimate the coefficients of value added, given by 
 
j
j
j
x
va
w                       (8) 
 
where wj is the coefficient of value added in sector j, vaj is the total value added in sector j, 
and xj is the level of production in sector j. 
 
The total value added multiplier of type I (VAj), generated in sector j, is given by 
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n
i
ijij bwVA
1
                                    (9) 
 
where bij is an element of matrix B described above. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses for simulation 
 
In order to grasp the differential effects associated to interregional government transfers, the 
interregional input-output model briefly described in the previous sub-section was estimated 
for 2004 considering the 26 Brazilian States and the Federal District. The interstate input-
output model also considers 110 products and 55 sectors in each region. A major effort in data 
compilation was undertaken in order to estimate the model.
2
 The simulation strategy is to 
introduce a shock related to the existing structure of interregional government transfers – as 
indicated in Table 1 – and to evaluate its distributional impacts (benchmark simulation). The 
main research question is to check whether the production structure acts in favor of more 
developed regions countervailing the redistributional effects of government transfers through 
the operation of indirect and induced multiplier effects. A counterfactual simulation is also 
carried out in which we consider that the structure of interregional government transfers 
would follow exactly the regional structure of Federal government’s tax revenue. To reach 
this goal we use a closed input-output model in which the regional household sectors are 
endogeneized. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
As for the benchmark simulation, Table 2 presents the first set of results whose focus is on the 
regional distribution of value added effects. For reference, column A shows the regional 
shares in GDP; column B replicates the regional distribution of the shocks while column C 
shows the regional distribution of the effects of transfers expenditures on the generation of 
value added in the Brazilian economy. Comparing such distributions in the last column of 
Table 2, one can have an idea on the presence of relevant leakages from lagging regions to 
more developed regions. For instance, while the States in the Southeast receive about 20% of 
total interregional transfers, they achieve one third of total value added associated with such 
                                                          
2
 For details on the methodology, see Haddad et al. (2002) and FIPE (2008).  
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expenditures. On the other hand, the Northeast region also achieve about the same share in the 
impact on value added (34,63%) but receiving almost 44% of total interregional transfers. 
States highlighted in the last column – Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Paraná, 
Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul and Distrito Federal – are those that have shown to receive 
benefits “beyond their contribution”, i.e. their share in total benefits is higher than their share 
in total expenditures. 
 
Another way of looking at these results is through the computation of the truncated regional 
value added multipliers, which shows the value added creation in the region per money unit of 
regional transfers received by the State. Such multipliers compare the region-specific value 
added effect based on the overall transfers (Column C) – thus capturing all interregional 
effects –, with the total amount of transfers accruing to the State (column B). The results are 
presented in Table 3. In the case of São Paulo, for instance, for each BRL 1.00 received from 
the Federal Government – and considering the transfers to other States as well – the State 
generates BRL 3.46 in value added, a proxy to the tax base. In the other extreme, Maranhão, 
one of the poorest states, generate only BRL 0.97 of value added per BRL 1.00 received as 
transfers. 
 
One can also look at output effects. In this case, Table 4 presents the results for the 
benchmark simulation. The last column highlights those states with above-the-average 
multipliers. Again, states in the Center-South of the country perform better, including also the 
Sate of Amazonas, in the North region. It is clear from these results that interregional 
feedback effects operate in favor of the more developed regions of the country. 
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Table 2. Regional Value Added Effects of Interregional Transfers in Brazil:  
Benchmark Simulation 
 
Regional Share in GRP (A) Regional Share in Expenditures (B) Regional Share in Total VA Impact (C) (C) - (B)
North 4.95 16.88 12.86 -4.02
RO 0.58 1.84 1.44 -0.41
AC 0.20 1.96 1.38 -0.58
AM 1.56 2.15 2.04 -0.11
RR 0.14 1.38 0.96 -0.42
PA 1.83 4.81 3.80 -1.01
AP 0.20 1.88 1.32 -0.56
TO 0.43 2.86 1.92 -0.94
Northeast 12.72 43.88 34.63 -9.25
MA 1.11 5.63 3.73 -1.90
PI 0.51 3.44 2.31 -1.13
CE 1.90 6.25 5.35 -0.91
RN 0.80 3.34 2.49 -0.85
PB 0.77 4.03 2.91 -1.12
PE 2.27 5.88 5.22 -0.66
AL 0.66 3.27 2.46 -0.82
SE 0.63 2.80 2.26 -0.55
BA 4.07 9.24 7.91 -1.33
Southeast 55.83 19.85 32.21 12.36
MG 9.13 8.94 8.78 -0.15
ES 2.07 1.61 1.65 0.04
RJ 11.48 2.16 4.85 2.69
SP 33.14 7.15 16.92 9.78
South 17.39 12.18 13.48 1.30
PR 6.31 4.92 5.15 0.23
SC 3.99 2.62 3.17 0.55
RS 7.10 4.63 5.15 0.52
Center-west 9.11 7.21 6.82 -0.39
MS 1.09 1.45 1.17 -0.27
MT 1.90 2.08 2.05 -0.03
GO 2.47 3.26 2.74 -0.52
DF 3.64 0.43 0.86 0.43  
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Table 3. Regional Value Added Multipliers of Interregional Transfers in Brazil:  
Benchmark Simulation 
 
Regional Transfers in BRL millions (A) Regional VA in BRL millions (B) (B)/(A)
North 12296.66 13703.88 1.11
RO 1343.92 1532.68 1.14
AC 1425.02 1469.50 1.03
AM 1567.57 2177.22 1.39
RR 1004.46 1023.34 1.02
PA 3505.69 4052.11 1.16
AP 1367.28 1405.50 1.03
TO 2082.72 2043.53 0.98
Northeast 31968.35 36889.68 1.15
MA 4099.90 3969.83 0.97
PI 2504.30 2463.41 0.98
CE 4554.73 5694.64 1.25
RN 2430.27 2652.47 1.09
PB 2934.73 3103.27 1.06
PE 4285.98 5562.40 1.30
AL 2384.13 2616.60 1.10
SE 2043.17 2402.52 1.18
BA 6731.13 8424.54 1.25
Southeast 14460.25 34307.60 2.37
MG 6509.35 9353.89 1.44
ES 1173.14 1759.28 1.50
RJ 1572.03 5167.66 3.29
SP 5205.73 18026.76 3.46
South 8869.58 14357.08 1.62
PR 3587.49 5490.96 1.53
SC 1907.48 3376.25 1.77
RS 3374.61 5489.87 1.63
Center-west 5252.89 7263.82 1.38
MS 1053.64 1248.47 1.18
MT 1512.47 2183.32 1.44
GO 2374.61 2919.15 1.23
DF 312.17 912.87 2.92
BRAZIL 72847.73 106522.06 1.46  
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Table 4. Regional Output Multipliers of Interregional Transfers in Brazil:  
Benchmark Simulation 
 
Regional Transfers in BRL millions (A) Regional Gross Output in BRL millions (B) (B)/(A)
North 12296.66 21139.75 1.72
RO 1343.92 2242.44 1.67
AC 1425.02 2008.04 1.41
AM 1567.57 4459.04 2.84
RR 1004.46 1432.22 1.43
PA 3505.69 6081.84 1.73
AP 1367.28 1885.61 1.38
TO 2082.72 3030.57 1.46
Northeast 31968.35 60583.94 1.90
MA 4099.90 6401.13 1.56
PI 2504.30 3790.98 1.51
CE 4554.73 9368.72 2.06
RN 2430.27 4205.55 1.73
PB 2934.73 4533.62 1.54
PE 4285.98 9363.88 2.18
AL 2384.13 4065.56 1.71
SE 2043.17 3571.92 1.75
BA 6731.13 15282.58 2.27
Southeast 14460.25 66430.91 4.59
MG 6509.35 16039.84 2.46
ES 1173.14 2887.30 2.46
RJ 1572.03 9859.47 6.27
SP 5205.73 37644.30 7.23
South 8869.58 28506.28 3.21
PR 3587.49 10712.93 2.99
SC 1907.48 6482.69 3.40
RS 3374.61 11310.66 3.35
Center-west 5252.89 13048.16 2.48
MS 1053.64 2261.70 2.15
MT 1512.47 3932.77 2.60
GO 2374.61 5177.63 2.18
DF 312.17 1676.05 5.37
BRAZIL 72847.73 189709.05 2.60  
 
 
So far, we have looked at the gross effects of constitutional interregional transfers. Given the 
known methodological limitations of our approach to deal with general equilibrium issues that 
involve price changes through the tax system
3
, we still can have a rough idea about the net 
effects of such transfer mechanism. To reach this goal, we have designed a counterfactual 
simulation in which we have used the regional structure of Federal government’s tax revenue 
to hypothetically distribute the interregional government transfers expenditures. The 
difference between the impacts of the benchmark simulation and the counterfactual simulation 
may be seen as a first approximation of the net results of the constitutional interregional 
transfer mechanism in Brazil. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
                                                          
3
 See, for instance, Shoven & Whalley (1992). 
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Column A presents the value added effects in the case interregional transfers are spent 
according to constitutional rules (status quo); column B shows the value added effects based 
on an hypothetical distribution of interregional transfers in which regional shares are the same 
as those verified in the revenue side. A first approximation of the net effects of interregional 
transfers is given by the difference between A and B. Two points deserve to be mentioned. 
First, it is clear that the constitutional transfer mechanisms favor the less developed regions of 
the country. Even though the existing economic structure lessens such redistributive effects, 
they help to achieve a more equitable interregional distribution of economic activity. Second, 
given this static picture, there does not appear a trade-off between equity and efficiency. As a 
matter of fact, total value added effects are a little bit (5%) higher in the benchmark 
simulation. This basically happens because of the stronger foreign import dependence of the 
states in the Center-South of the country. With higher import coefficients from the rest of the 
world, a higher share of expenditures in this region produces smaller multipliers. It is 
important to highlight that such static results should be viewed, as emphasized above, as a 
first approximation of the impacts. 
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Table 5.  Net Regional Value Added Effects of Interregional Transfers in Brazil:  
Comparison of the Benchmark and the Counterfactual Simulations 
Benchmark Simulation (A) Counterfactual Simulation (B) (C)=(A)-(B) (C)/(B)
North 13703.88 1979.12 11724.76 5.92
RO 1532.68 209.13 1323.55 6.33
AC 1469.50 61.15 1408.35 23.03
AM 2177.22 870.92 1306.30 1.50
RR 1023.34 40.97 982.37 23.98
PA 4052.11 597.96 3454.15 5.78
AP 1405.50 48.73 1356.77 27.85
TO 2043.53 150.27 1893.26 12.60
Northeast 36889.68 5653.73 31235.95 5.52
MA 3969.83 308.64 3661.19 11.86
PI 2463.41 144.80 2318.61 16.01
CE 5694.64 839.84 4854.80 5.78
RN 2652.47 263.19 2389.28 9.08
PB 3103.27 275.44 2827.82 10.27
PE 5562.40 1148.79 4413.61 3.84
AL 2616.60 251.27 2365.32 9.41
SE 2402.52 253.49 2149.04 8.48
BA 8424.54 2168.27 6256.27 2.89
Southeast 34307.60 72029.43 -37721.83 -0.52
MG 9353.89 7357.64 1996.25 0.27
ES 1759.28 1553.57 205.71 0.13
RJ 5167.66 17636.73 -12469.07 -0.71
SP 18026.76 45481.49 -27454.72 -0.60
South 14357.08 12832.30 1524.79 0.12
PR 5490.96 4894.74 596.22 0.12
SC 3376.25 2912.26 463.99 0.16
RS 5489.87 5025.29 464.58 0.09
Center-west 7263.82 9432.45 -2168.64 -0.23
MS 1248.47 476.28 772.19 1.62
MT 2183.32 842.71 1340.61 1.59
GO 2919.15 1630.09 1289.07 0.79
DF 912.87 6483.38 -5570.50 -0.86
BRAZIL 106522.06 101927.04 4595.03 0.05  
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
The main goal of this paper was to evaluate the implications of interregional government 
transfers in Brazil for the pattern of regional development within the country. The main 
research question was to check whether the production structure acts in favor of more 
developed regions countervailing the redistributional effects of government transfers through 
the operation of indirect and induced multiplier effects. As for regional concentration, which 
is therefore the main object of this paper, the effects are clearly favorable. The Northeast and 
North regions increase their share in national GDP, as their shares in total value added effect 
exceed their respective shares in GDP. Thus, interregional government transfers present a 
clear, favorable regional impact. Since it is targeted to poor regions, with a clear spatial focus, 
it ends-up producing a de-concentration effect. This effect is, of course, larger if government 
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expenditures follow the proposed transfer mechanisms, since the regional pattern of central 
government tax revenue, if followed, would be more pro-concentration. 
 
One last point that should be further emphasized is the role played by the existing economic 
structure in terms of reducing the initial redistributive effects of interregional government 
transfers. Our analysis has shown that interregional linkages within the Brazilian economy 
operate favoring the more developed regions of the country, as there are relevant leakages 
from lagging regions to more developed regions. Actually, while the States in the Southeast 
receive about 20% of total interregional transfers, they achieve one third of total value added 
associated with such expenditures. Meanwhile, the Northeast region also achieve about the 
same share in the impact on value added (34,63%) but receiving almost 44% of total 
interregional transfers. As it turned out, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Paraná, 
Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul and Distrito Federal are the States that have shown to 
receive benefits “beyond their contribution”, i.e. their share in total benefits is higher than 
their share in total expenditures. While the design of constitutional interregional transfer funds 
in Brazil do present a strong spatial focus – “poorer regions get more” –, the persistence of 
regional dualism in Brazil is nonetheless reinforced by the structure of productive 
interdependence of the economy, as our results have demonstrated. 
 
 
References 
 
Baer, W. & G. J. D. Hewings (Eds.) (2007). Equity Distortion in Regional Resource 
Allocation in Brazil. New York, Haworth Press. 
 
Bergvall, D., C. Charbit, D.-J. Kraan & O. Merk (2006). “Intergovernmental Transfers and 
Decentralised Public Spending”. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 5(4), 111-158. 
 
Bird, R. & A. Tarasov (2002). “Closing the Gap: Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental 
Transfers in Developed Federations”. International Studies Program, Working Paper 02-02. 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. 
 
Dias, M. F. & R. Silva (2004). “Central Government Transfers and Regional Convergence in 
Portugal”. Paper presented at the 2004 European Regional Science Association Conference, 
Mimeo. 
 
FIPE (2008). “Matriz Interestadual de Insumo-Produto para o Brasil, 2004”, Relatório de 
Pesquisa, mimeo. 
 
24 
 
Garcia-Milà, T. & T. J. McGuire (2004). “Do Interregional Transfers Improve the Economic 
Performance of Poor Regions? The Case of Spain”. International Tax and Public Finance, 
8(3), 281-296. 
 
Groenewold, N., A. Hagger & J. R. Madden (2003). “Interregional Transfers: A Political 
Economy CGE Approach”. Papers in Regional Science, 82, 535-554. 
 
Haddad, E. A. (1999). Regional Inequality and Structural Changes: Lesson from the 
Brazilian Economy. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Haddad, E. A., C. R. Azzoni, E. P. Domingues & F. S. Perobelli (2002). “Macroeconomia dos 
Estados e Matriz Interestadual de Insumo-Produto”. Economia Aplicada, 6(4), 875-895. 
 
Miller, R.E. & P.D. Blair (1985). Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Monteiro Neto, A. (2006) “Fluxos de Renda Fiscal versus Fluxos de Renda via Comércio: O 
Que Há de Novo na Direção e Magnitude da Ação Redistributiva do Governo Federal nas 
Regiões Brasileiras”. Texto para Discussão 1230, IPEA. 
 
Nam, C. W. & R. Parsche (2001). “Municipal Finance in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development”. MOCT-
MOST Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 11 (2), 113-34. 
 
Rolim, C. F. C., C. C. Machado, L. Lavinas, M. B. Lemos, M. Magina & E. Rios-Neto 
(1996). “Saldo Comercial, Transferências Governamentais e Movimento de Capitais Inter-
regional”. Estudos Econômicos, 26(1), 5-19. 
 
Shoven, J. B. & Whalley, J. (1992). Applying General Equilibrium. Cambridge Surveys of 
Economic Literature. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Temple, M. (1994). Regional Economics. New York: St. Martin’s Press 
